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Abstract We are concerned with the problem of aggregating infinite utility
streams and the possible adoption of consequentialist equity principles when
using numerical evaluations of the streams. We find a virtually universal incom-
patibility between the Basu-Mitra approach (that advocates for social welfare
functions and renounces continuity assumptions) and postulates that capture
various forms of strict preference for a reduction in inequality like the Strong
Equity Principle, the Pigou-Dalton Transfer principle, or Altruistic Equity.
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21 Introduction
This paper is primarily concerned with the problem of aggregating infinite
utility streams by means of numerical evaluations, and the possible adoption
of consequentialist equity principles under such position. Our objective is to
argue that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the Basu-Mitra
approach (that uses social welfare functions and renounces continuity assump-
tions) and salient postulates of strict inequality aversion like the Strong Equity
Principle (cf., Bossert et al., 2007), the Pigou-Dalton Transfer principle (cf.,
Sakai, 2006, and Bossert et al., 2007), or Altruistic Equity (cf., Sakamoto,
2011). All these axioms have the common spirit of expressing a strict prefer-
ence for distributions of utilities among generations that reduce inequality in
various forms.
The essential shortfall of the approach by numerical evaluations or so-
cial welfare functions (SWFs) in the context of intergenerational equity has
been brought to the fore by a number of contributions. Either if one requests
anonymity-type properties (Basu and Mitra, 2003, Crespo et al., 2009), the
very mild Hammond Equity for the Future (Banerjee, 2006, Alcantud and
Garc´ıa-Sanz, 2010a), or variations of other consequentialist principles of aver-
sion to inequality (Alcantud, 2010, 2011, and Sakamoto, 2011), relaxed –but
not universally acceptable– versions of the Pareto principle like strong Pareto,
weak dominance, or weak Pareto, lead to incompatibility under different spec-
ifications of the domain of utility sequences. Here we go further and prove that
with the simple assumption of monotonicity, which does not impose any ethical
restriction but is just an uncontroversial consistency requirement, SWFs must
contradict the ethics of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle at the level of a es-
pecially plausible generalization. This implies that other distributional axioms
implying Pigou-Dalton under monotonicity, like the Strong Equity Principle or
the Lorenz domination principle, also deem incompatible with the Basu-Mitra
approach.
2 Notation and definitions
Let X denote a subset of RN, that represents a domain of utility sequences
or infinite-horizon utility streams. For simplicity we assume X = Y N and
say that Y is the set of feasible utilities. We adopt the standard notation for
utility streams: x = (x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X. We write x > y if xi > yi for each
i = 1, 2, ..., and x y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, .... Also, x > y means x > y
and x 6= y.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X −→ R. The analysis
of intergenerational aggregation by means of SWFs is usually called the Basu-
Mitra approach.
We are concerned with the following efficiency axioms:
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) > W(y) .
3The next efficiency axiom are all implied by Strong Pareto. Monotonicity
is regarded as a necessary condition for efficiency thus all our results refer to
monotonic SWFs:
Axiom MON (Monotonicity). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) >
W(y) .
Another fairly justifiable weakening of SP is the following:
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x y then W(x) > W(y).
An independent weaker version of Strong Pareto is:
Axiom WD (Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X and there is j ∈ N such that
xj > yj , and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then W(x) > W(y).
Now we recall some axioms that intend to prioritize more egalitarian al-
locations by expressing a strict preference for certain distributions of utilities
among generations.
Axiom PDT (Pigou-Dalton transfer principle). If x,y ∈ X are such that
there is ε > 0 with yj = xj − ε > yk = xk + ε for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt
when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x).
PDT is a consequentialist equity principle stating that a transfer of utility
from a generation that is richer to a poorer generation must be socially ben-
eficial provided that their relative positions do not change. It is a notion of
inequality aversion in a cardinal vein that has been introduced in this litera-
ture by Bossert et al. (2007) –under the name strict transfer principle– and
Sakai (2006). 1
A reinforced form of both PDT and the classical Hammond Equity postu-
late is the following axiom (cf., Bossert et al., 2007):
Axiom SEP (Strict Equity Principle). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj >
yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x).
Under SEP, any utility sacrice made by a richer generation that is rewarded
by any utility gain by a poorer generation is socially beneficial when their
relative positions do not change. As a variant of the ethics supporting PDT,
Hara et al. (2006) propose a more acceptable postulate in the following form:
Axiom AE (Altruistic Equity). If x,y ∈ X are such that there are ε >
δ > 0 with yj = xj − δ > yk = xk + ε for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when
j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x).
Compared to PDT, the ethical principle under AE is less demanding: It
only claims that reductions in welfare for the rich that are accompanied by
increases to the poor must be socially preferred when the gain of the poor is
1 The formulation in Bossert et al. (2007) is different but equivalent: if x,y ∈ X are such
that xj > yj > yk > xk and xj + xk = yj + yk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when
j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x).
4greater than the loss of the rich. 2 It is simple to check that monotonic SWFs
that verify either MON or WD and PDT must verify AE (v., Hara et al., 2006,
for a related fact).
Finally, our next axiom is the usual “equal treatment of all generations”
postulate a`-la-Sidgwick and Diamond.
Axiom AN (Anonymity). Any finite permutation of a utility stream pro-
duces a socially indifferent utility stream.
3 Pigou-Dalton, Altruistic Equity, and the existence of monotonic
Social Welfare Functions
Although the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and anonymity can be combined
with weak dominance under representability of the social evaluation (cf., Al-
cantud 2010, Proposition 5), we proceed to show that this does not reconciles
PDT with the Basu-Mitra approach: Under extremely weak technical assump-
tions on the structure of the set of feasible utilities, every monotonic SWF
must contradict the weaker AE. In order to anticipate the reasons for our very
mild technical restrictions, observe that PDT and AE hold vacuously unless X
has some specific composition. In particular, since X = Y N we must request
that in order for PDT to impose real egalitarian restrictions on the evaluations
the following must be true: there are x1, x1 + t, x1 + 2t ∈ Y for some t > 0. If
there are x1, x1 + t, x1 + 2t, x1 + 3t ∈ Y for some t > 0 then AE is non-trivial
too.
Therefore in order to state our main result, not only we need to refer to the
cardinality or the ordinal properties of the set of feasible utilities but also to its
intrinsic specification. In this we separate from other related antecedents. For
example, when studying SWFs on domains of utility streams with the form
X = Y N, the following facts are known. Basu and Mitra (2003) proves that
AN and SP are incompatible as long as Y has at least 2 different elements.
Theorem 2 in Alcantud and Garc´ıa-Sanz (2010b) assures that HE and SP
are incompatible as long as Y has at least 4 different elements. Dubey and
Mitra (2011) characterized the restrictions on Y for which AN and WP are
compatible. These are precisely the sets Y that do not contain any set of the
order-type of the set of integer numbers.
Theorem 1 Suppose Y is a set of real numbers such that there are x1 ∈ Y
and t > 0 with x1 +kt ∈ Y , k = 1, ..., 6. Then there are not SWFs on X = Y N
that verify MON and AE.
Proof We assume without loss of generality that {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} ⊆ Y . We use
a standard construction to produce a suitable uncountable collection {Ei}i∈I
2 Sakamoto (2011) uses the term Altruistic Equity-1 or AE-1 instead. He also uses another
variant of PDT that is called Altruistic Equity-2 or AE-2. Because we are maintaining the
basic principle of monotonicity throughout, and AE-2 and SEP are equivalent under MON,
we do not need to refer to Sakamoto’s AE-2 in our paper.
5of infinite proper subsets of N. We request that ∀i, j ∈ I [ i < j ⇒ Ei (
Ej and Ej − Ei is infinite ]. We do not lose generality if we assume {1, 2} ⊆
Ei for every index i ∈ I. In order to justify that such collection exists, we
take {r1, r2, ....} an enumeration of the rational numbers in I = (0, 1), set
E′(i) = {n ∈ N : rn < i} for each i ∈ I and then E(i) = E′(i) ∪ {1, 2}.
Let us define the following two utility streams associated with each i ∈ I:
r(i)p =
5 if p ∈ {1, 2}3 if p ∈ Ei − {1, 2}
0 otherwise
l(i)p =
6 if p = 13 if p ∈ Ei − {1}
0 otherwise
By AE, the open interval (W(l(i)), W(r(i))) is not empty: When passing from
l(i) to r(i), one unit is lost by generation 1 while generation 2 gains two units,
and both have the same endowment at r(i), namely 5.
We intend to check that j < i ⇒ W(l(i)) > W(r(j)), which is impos-
sible because an uncountable number of distinct rational numbers would be
obtained. Select k ∈ Ei−Ej , thus 1 6= k 6= 2. We make use of an intermediate
stream, namely z ∈ X defined as follows:
zp =

6 if p = 1
5 if p = 2
3 if p ∈ Ei − {1, 2, k}
0 otherwise
AE ensues W(l(i)) > W(z): When passing from z to l(i), two units are lost
by generation 2 and generation k gains three units, and both have the same
endowment at l(i), namely 3.
Now MON implies W(z) > W(r(j)) and the thesis follows. C
Obviously our results have similar implications for distributional axioms
implying AE under MON, like SEP, PDT, or the Lorenz domination principle
(LD) which is stronger than PDT (cf., e.g., Hara et al., 2008).
Corollary 1 In the conditions of Theorem 1, there are not SWFs that verify
MON and SEP, resp., PDT, LD.
In fact, when there are x1 ∈ Y and t > 0 with x1 +kt ∈ Y , k = 1, 2, 3 there
is no SWFs on X = Y N that verifies MON and PDT.
Proof The first statement is trivial because SEP ⇒ PDT ⇒ AE under MON,
and LD ⇒ PDT. The second one requires a straightforward modification of
the argument above. The key facts are: Assume without loss of generality that
{0, 1, 2, 3} ⊆ Y , and proceed with the following definitions.
r(i)p =
2 if p ∈ {1, 2}1 if p ∈ Ei − {1, 2}
0 otherwise
l(i)p =
3 if p = 11 if p ∈ Ei − {1}
0 otherwise
6zp =

3 if p = 1
2 if p = 2
1 if p ∈ Ei − {1, 2, k}
0 otherwise
C
We also observe that the restriction on the form of Y is met by the most
usual requirements:
Corollary 2 If N ⊆ Y or Y = [0, 1], there are not SWFs on X = Y N that
verify MON and SEP, resp., PDT, LD, AE.
4 Conclusion
Theorems 1 and 2 in Bossert et al. (2007) prove that both PDT and SEP are
compatible with orderings on R∞ that verify Strong Pareto and anonymity.
Nevertheless the literature on egalitarianism in the evaluation of infinite streams
of utilities has provided evidences that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, as
well as the Lorenz domination principle, conflict with weak forms of continu-
ity and rationality even in the absence of Paretian restrictions (cf., Hara et al.
2008). More precisely, denote by l∞+ the set of all bounded infinite sequences
of non-negative real numbers. Then, provided that X verifies a technical con-
dition including l∞+ ⊆ X , there exists no acyclic social evaluation satisfying
PDT, resp. LD, and P -upper or lower semicontinuity (each of which is im-
plied by Diamond’s continuity). Our result compares to this statement in that
without the appeal to any controversial form of the Paretian axiom, but with
virtually no requirement on the domain of utility streams, a principle that
relaxes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle into an ethically more acceptable
form is incompatible with a numerical evaluation of the streams. These argu-
ments speak for the difficulty of implementing the ethics of strict preference
for a reduction in inequality in the intergenerational welfare analysis.
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